We’ve looked a little at the question of people overestimating their competence, and what we can or can’t do about it. We’ve also touched on what seems to me to be the really central issue here: whether or not we can identify such people generally - or even such episodes in ourselves. Let’s look a little more closely at that:
The problem isn’t merely that some people think they’re smart and we think they’re dumb; it’s that we can never really be sure which of us is right, or when. With that in mind, please consider this example, regarding someone who was unquestionably one of the most important and influential military figures in American history:
In the most frightening and confusing days of August and September 1950, with North Korean forces preparing to overwhelm the US Eighth Army at Pusan, General Douglas MacArthur’s strategic brilliance and iron will prevailed over universal resistance from his own staff and supporting services to create one of history’s most stunningly successful victories at Inchon.
Here’s the thing: He was convinced he was right, that the Inchon landing was the key to reversing a military situation that was threatening to collapse at any moment. But all others - this is worth repeating: everyone else, from his own staff together with key figures in the Navy and Marine units called in to support the mission, to expert scientific advisors - were just as convinced he was wrong. The tides, weather, over and under-water geography, daylight/moonlight conditions, combined with the defensive and offensive military capabilities available for employment in the area all pointed to almost certain failure.
But who turned out to be the smart one, and who the dummies, in this instance? An imminent and humiliating defeat was transformed into a stunning and potentially war-ending triumph - a truly historic military victory.
However, as a direct consequence of that very same strategic vision and iron will, General MacArthur later ignored warnings from all quarters regarding Chinese entrance into the war, resulting in the rout of US forces and very nearly in the loss of an entire US division. As a result, a historic victory slipped from our grasp, and we were left to console ourselves with a costly stalemate. We continue to deal even today with the destabilizing and dangerous consequences of this.
How does the math work out on this one - who’s the dummy and who the smart ones this time? More importantly, what does that really say about the issue of intelligence and leadership? We do expect to have smart people around us, and we certainly would expect that they know they’re smart.
But as we’ve seen in the example above, we can’t expect to know, ourselves - even when it is most critical that we should - who is the smart one and who the dummy, and - just as interestingly - when they are or are not actually in possession of those characteristics.
So what does that mean with respect to dummies thinking that they are smarter than they really are? For one thing, it throws our assumption of self-contented superiority, in the presence of that dismissive observation, into grave doubt. And, I might add, quite rightly.
But before we get deeper into that, there was something else in that example - iron will - worth taking a look at in this context. I hope you’ll join us for that, tomorrow.
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Here is a list of all the posts in this popular series:
- Radiating Imbecility
- Rays of hope
- Pulsating inconsistency
- Radiating confidence
- Blind faith
- Mirror, mirror . . .
- Socratic genius
- Socratic ignorance
- Socratic method
- First principles
- The Socratic attitude
- Why we do what we do
- Recon by fire
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6 Comments
One thing I’d like to mention is that we shouldn’t confuse success with level of competence or intelligence. I know you’re not saying otherwise… but I feel like I should make this point.
Competence is not perfection. It isn’t realistic to expect people to go through their lives, in areas even where they are competent experts, and be free from error.
We operate in a world where we have incomplete access to the right information, and a lot of access to the wrong information. Competent leaders will be more adept than most to sort through all that and get what he or she needs to make the best decision possible in that circumstance, and there are times (particularly in warfare) when decisions must be made with respect to the best information at hand.
Medical care is another example of this. If a doctor analyzes a situation and recognizes certain systems, he might be inclined to perform a certain treatment. That he might have been wrong ultimately doesn’t mean he was incompetent or made the wrong diagnoses with respect to the symptoms that were described to him, but it might mean that he had incomplete access to the right information.
Organizational leaders must be able to tell the difference between failures that result from incompetence and those that result from a defective process or a simple mistake that people are bound to make.
If they punish people for making the correct decision in the wrong process and/or with the wrong information, then people will begin to learn indecisiveness, which can be more destructive than having only a marginally competent leader who can make a decision when he needs to.
Cam,
You should make this into an article: “Competence is not Perfection.”
Your points are so solid, and so rarely or incompletely understood in the general population.
What’s so fascinating about your reference to making decisions on the basis of the best information available in the context of the example in my post is that MacArthur rejected the best information available each time - the first time he was right, and the second time wrong - both times spectacularly.
The doctor in your example begins by competently making the right decision given the information initially available when a decision cannot be postponed, but which nevertheless turns out to require reversal, which the doctor would likely competently make as the quality of the available information improved.
The doctor and MacArthur would appear to be two different sorts of people. Which one do we celebrate? Which one would we rather have as a manager? Which one would we rather have had in command in Korea, and which in a hospital emergency ward?
As you say, we must be able to identify not just failure, but its underlying cause, so we can apply the correct remedy. But we often are as subject to the same impairments in making these judgments as the people and situations we are judging.
MacArthur earned tremendous credibility after Inchon, which caused people - both his staff and his seniors - to subsequently invest too much confidence in his intelligence and insight, and too little in their own. The result was the rollback from the border, during which we had a US Army division effectively destroyed for combat purposes, and almost lost a Marine division at Chosin (the reason we didn’t lose the Marines is actually deeply related to this discussion).
That’s what’s so great about your comment: Like your doctor, we need to make a decision when we need to make one. But we also need to be alert to evidence that we got it wrong, and to be willing to adapt to emerging evidence or improving assessments of it.
But the dilemma is that we often are unable to do that - indeed, in the management field, we are too-often subtly dissuaded from doing that. But I’ll be getting into that, later.
Thanks, Cam, for taking the time for such a considered criticism - it’s right on the money and much appreciated, and will add great value to the discussion.
Jim,
I’ll continue the conversation here.
re: Cam’s excellent comment:
Would it be fair to say that we judge on results only? One could be a jerk salesperson, but the #1 seller? Was MacArthur just lucky at Inchon? Or unlucky later? The emperor Virgil said that ‘fortune favors the bold’ - though rarely 100%.
As managers, we may need to base our judgments on value-based results over time (trend) versus a single event.
Joe -
Far be it for me to hastily generalize, but when I look at the news headlines that explain CMOs and agencies getting fired so soon after starting (and seeing it first hand with some of our clients) for failing to deliver immediate results, I begin to suspect there is something afoot greater than random chance. As Jim said so well, “we often are as subject to the same impairments in making these judgments as the people and situations we are judging.”
What I don’t know is if that’s the exception or the rule. I understand that there is a tremendous pressure to succeed and succeed quickly, though.
Was MacArthur lucky at Inchon or unlucky later? Tough to say. I guess it depends on what you consider luck. He was most successful, after all, whenever he trusted his Marines to do the fighting for him.
Speaking of which… Jim - Of course I’d love to read your evaluation of Chosin at some point.
Hi Joe,
These are key points, that you are identifying. Results are what we are, and should, measure on. And, by the way, it’s certainly not fair to measure Gen. MacArthur on the Korean War, alone. But I introduced those episodes from it to illustrate that whatever may be producing those results - it’s not unrestrained self-confidence alone. That often arises from being convinced you are right, which conviction, as I’ve argued, itself may very well arise from the fact that you are wrong, but unable or unwilling to see that. The moral of Gen. MacArthur’s experience in Korea is in there.
But a really interesting aspect of this part of the discussion is suggested by your reference to “fortune favors the bold” - this referred to the age of princes who embodied the state, not managers who work for owners. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t apply, just that, it seems to me, we should be cautious about encouraging our managers to perceive themselves as princes restrained only by the limits of their own daring, rather than by their fiduciary responsibilities.
Still, all of that said, it’s hard to argue that fortune doesn’t favor the bold most of the time, as you say. But I don’t think it is isolating boldness as the fundamental characteristic that wins the day, but proposing it as the one that, all other things being equal, tips the scales in your favor.
I’m trying to shake our general confidence in “leaders” who radiate confidence, so that we can understand that aspect of the quote, and look behind the arrogance to see what’s really filling the sails. But you’re adding a level of complexity to the discussion that needs to be there.
You’re right, of course, that we need to base our judgments on results over time. Gen. MacArthur established his reputation over time - over a long and remarkably successful and brilliant career - he actually had served as Chief of Staff of the Army and retired before WWII started, and was called out of retirement to run the Western Pacific campaign against Japan. He then served as one of the most successful military governors of an occupied territory in history. And then: Korea. The lesson, then, isn’t just in how we evaluate our leaders, but in how we evaluate ourselves as we fill our sails with our own reputations.
This is really good stuff - thanks so much!
Hello Cam,
One of the key aims of this series is to look at what we are being taught about management, and by whom, and to develop a framework for examining those issues. Despite all the presumed expertise out there, we seem to be creating an environment, as you describe, of gladiatorial contests. And we all - managers, consultants, academics - are complicit in it.
As for Gen. MacArthur and luck - I think the luck enters into the situation when we surrender our judgment to people of his overpowering reputation and supreme confidence - we really don’t have any basis for doing so - it’s just that the coin keeps coming up heads and who are we to bet that it won’t again if someone just seems to be able to make it always do that?
That attitude certainly bears looking at. But I don’t think MacArthur relied on luck. At Inchon, he was right - but how did he know that, in the face of such universal resistance? And at the reversal in late 1950, he was wrong - willfully and stubbornly so - and how could he not have known that in the face of such overwhelming evidence? That attitude - and what really underlies these two decisions - bears looking at also.
Those are my quick thoughts on your comments. It’s the key point, though, isn’t it? How do we know, and when do we know it - and on the basis of what do we make the judgment?
In a world of supremely confident morons, how do we know when the moron is the judged or the judge? In both of the MacArthur examples, all parties were supremely confident. Tough questions.
Gen. MacArthur did like the Marines, didn’t he? Since WWII. Actually, today, December 6, is considered the end of the Chosin campaign in 1950. There are so many lessons in it; I’ll try to find an appropriate occasion to write about them.
Thanks so much for your thoughtful and though-provoking comments - you’ve given me a lot of material to absorb!
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